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Abstract
This paper deals with what we consider to be key negative elements of current globalisa-
tion processes, and examines critically the dominance of the concept of global govern-
ance as a mode of control. This draws attention fi rstly to the fact that globalisation has an 
intentionally political orientation. Secondly, we are interested in approaches which can 
counteract the defi cits with respect to democracy and the environment which are associ-
ated with globalisation. This is not a directly action-oriented approach, but a conceptional 
analysis.  
Drawing on the work of the Study Commission of the German Bundestag “Globalisation 
of the World Economy” (2002), we outline the concept of global governance and point 
out democratic weaknesses. Following this, we present approaches which, with their spe-
cifi c localisation of civil society and a different concept of the political, seem suited to do 
justice to the political dimensions and the problems of globalisation processes. 
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1 Introduction 
In the report of the Study Commission of the German Bundestag “Globalisation of the 
Global Economy – Challenges and Responses”1 the fi nal section of the majority report is 
entitled “Shaping globalisation through global governance”. This highlights the explicitly 
political intent of the concept of global governance. The sustainability debate, conven-
tionally focused on environmental, economic and social, rather than political dimensions, 
provides little support for the current discussion of global governance. 
The globalisation process increasingly withdraws political substance from liberal repre-
sentative democracies, and by no means only because of a loss of national sovereignty. 
With the shrinking of space and time as a result of progress particularly in the fi elds of 
information and communications technology, the hypermobility of capital across increas-
ingly liberalised and integrated fi nancial markets following in the wake of the implo-
sion of the socialist state systems has led to a global expansion of the capitalist mode of 
production and the integration of more and more regions of the world in the capitalist 
market system. This in turn has transformed the lives of people, and has brought with 
it an increasing social polarisation between North, South and East, as well as within the 
OECD states themselves. Liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation remain the central 
engines of this process. The standard neo-liberal recipe “with the private sector as the 
engine of growth” contains a highly political statement. The globalisation process not 
only breaks down the boundaries of national states, but also leads to the erosion of their 
decision-making agency. New actors and new levels make their appearance in the politi-
cal arena, usually with little transparency and democratic determination of the common 
good.
But what happens when key public services for public are surrendered to the private sec-
tor of the economy and as a result citizens turn into customers? How does this effect the 
democratic shaping of the common good? What will happen to the right of public delib-
eration on public goods forming essential part of the common good, and to participation, 
transparency, accountability, and legitimisation, when increasing areas are moved from 
the realm of citizenship to that of the customer? And, while privatisation reduces pressure 
on the public sector and leads to the transfer of key services into private households, to 
what extent – invisible to the public eye – will there be a reversion to highly asymmetrical 
gender roles? 
The political space is being re-allotted. If democracy is not to lose out in the process, the 
political space will have to be conceptionally reviewed within the terms of a substantiated 
concept of democracy, including gender democracy, and the corresponding approaches 
should be identifi ed. As our initial hypothesis we would propose that, in order to direct 
1 We use Study Commission when referring to the offi cial English translation of the Summary 
Report and Enquete when a quotation is taken from the German version.
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globalisation to sustainable pathways, democracy must be reviewed and newly concep-
tionalised. 
A large part of the literature on the current demands of governance is based on the implicit 
or explicit assumption that everything was more or less fi ne with democracy until the 
start of what is generally referred to as the “Erosion of the nation state”. It was only when 
globalisation led to the “post-national constellation” (Habermas 1998) and increasing 
global economic integration that the marginalisation of the political sphere led to the dis-
concerting defi cit in democracy which the debate about global governance is searching 
to redress. 
We are not arguing that there are two separate spheres – politics and economy – of which 
one gains dominance at the expense of the other. Rather, we see globalisation – or more 
precisely ʻcorporate-driven globalisationʼ, as taking place within the political sphere, 
changing it in the process. The neo-liberal project of corporate-driven globalisation 
insists on so-called free, deregulated markets as the primary locations for profi table busi-
ness, and demands at the same time an increase in the density of regulations regarding 
state guarantees of ownership rights and conditions of competition. New confi gurations 
are generated between the Public and Private which lead to the erosion of democracy, in 
particular where the privatisation processes transform public rights into private demand 
based on the ability to pay. We are unable to accept Ulrich Beckʼs all-too-modest proposal 
for a “consumer-oriented democracy” (Beck 1998, p. 35); it would seem that the “DM, 
Yen, Swiss Franc or Dollar ʻballots  ʼ“ (Altvater/Mahnkopf 1996, p. 14) are rather unfairly 
distributed for this.
Globalisation, then, is a political project. In the course of globalisation, the principles of 
territoriality, sovereignty and legality of the received international system of states have 
become fragile. However, “at the same time, globalisation is not a process that just hap-
pened. The intensifi cation of global economic integration was politically desired.” (Study 
Commission 2002, p. 10) The neo-liberal perspective of the economy, society and state is 
based on the assumption that only the market is in a position to secure an effi cient alloca-
tion of resources in the service of all, and that this is a truth of global validity. It is con-
cerned with “establishing the market as the dominant mode of social regulation” (Zürn 
1998, p. 292). By the same token the dominant school of economics accepts the steady 
increase of  the scope for ʻ private  ʼglobal actors and the reduction in state welfare services 
accompanied by a dramatic increase in the inequality of ownership and wealth, and that 
at the same time the opportunities to shape communal life in a democratic fashion are 
continually being reduced. 
Ulrich Beck speaks in this context of “Politicising by de-politicising the state … The bal-
ance of power, the contract of the fi rst modern age based on nation states, erodes and is 
transferred – past the government and parliament, the public realm and the courts – into 
the sole responsibility of economic action” (Beck 1998, p. 24 f.). Yet, powerful economic 
interests, fi rmly anchored in the political system, are well-able to evade these ʻlawsʼ, 
whether by legal or extra-legal means, if it seems to them that the laws of the market do 
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not serve their interests suffi ciently. At the same time, decisions made with deference to 
supposed economic constraints, and frequently relocated in the multifarious, often less 
public forums, help to support “the image of a post-political world.” (ibid., p. 20)
In order to establish a global market order in accordance with neo-liberal philosophy, to 
enforce its implementation and to limit its destabilising effects, a considerable degree of 
regulatory intervention is required. Deregulation is therefore not an automatic process of 
erosion of state agency, but the consequence of political decisions which are transmitted 
within a specifi c pattern of legitimisation. In fact, it would be more accurate to talk of a 
politically intended shift in regulation. In areas such as internal security, for example, the 
level of regulation has tended to increase. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) with its 
many demands on nation states to act or to desist from action only provides a framework 
within which the nation states undertake to comply with neo-liberal rules.  
Re-confi guration of Public and Private
A central feature of neo-liberal globalisation is that it leads to a re-structuring of the 
political space. But the pursuance of the common good is greatly encumbered by what 
can be termed the “new privatness” and the associated dual tendency to privatisation. 
A “lean” state apparatus is created by transferring wide areas, in particular of the social 
infrastructure to private economic agents. Of necessity this process not only relinquishes 
space for state action, but also the stateʼs capacity for effective regulation is strongly put 
at risk, if not equally surrendered. Frequently, transnational corporations and non-state 
organisations take on tasks which were previously in state hands. Without an appropriate 
institutional infrastructure, this all too often results in the effi ciency and quality of serv-
ices being called into question, contrary to the claims advanced in justifi cation of such 
changes. In addition, there are often dramatic consequences for the access opportunities 
of the poor strata of the population. In the developed industrial countries this affects 
above all the welfare sector with the elements of care and social security as well as the 
delivery of essential services, in particular at local levels. At the same time citizenship 
rights and entitlements addressed to the political directorate in the public arena become 
transformed into private demand and a matter for market negotiations. As a consequence 
of neo-liberal priorities national competitiveness and location advantages are granted 
unreserved privilege. Extensive areas of the social security system and the provision of 
basic services become the responsibility of individualised private agents. This affects pri-
vate households by impinging on available income and burdening them with an additional 
work load. The experience with structural adjustment programmes in the Global South 
and in the transformation countries demonstrates graphically that reducing the burden on 
the state budget leads to an increase of the burdens above all of women. Called back into 
their role as care givers in the private sphere they do all they can individually to meet care 
needs, which once again become invisible rather than being seen as what they in fact are, 
namely a contribution to the reproduction of the overall economy. 
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The reconfi guration of the relation between public and private is linked to a restructuring 
of gender relations, and there are clear efforts to organise these again in accordance with 
the traditional order. But it is by no means always possible to turn the horizon of experi-
ence and the self-realisation of women back to the domestic sphere satisfactorily and 
without contradiction. Very often, women experience the re-privatisation as more or less 
forced upon them; it also creates pressure on the family income. And if in addition the 
gender role of men as bread-winner and head of the family also comes under considerable 
pressure (gender anxiety), then the burdens more and more often lead to violent forms of 
acting out gender relations (Nayaran 2000). 
In addition to these restructuring shifts, there are also processes of informalisation. We 
observe these world-wide both in the organisation of labour in the production and the 
services sectors as well as on levels of political decision-making. In both cases we are 
 confronted with a gradual process of erosion of rights and desintegration of democracy 
(Sassen 2000, Altvater/Mahnkopf 2002).
Erosion of the common good and of democracy 
On the global level, “the transition of the primarily politically defi ned competition of sys-
tems to the predominantly economically defi ned competition of locations” (Study Com-
mission 2002, p. 9) systematically undermines the unity of social and political spaces 
and contributes to the re-structuring of the relationship between state organs, the political 
class and the population. “The space of the political disappears and consequently the 
locus of democracy.” (Altvater 1997, p. 250) The new orientation of the state towards 
market competition also results in fi scal redistribution from bottom to top. In addition, 
it leads to a grave neglect of democratic, developmental, and environmental values, and 
not the least also endangers public goods. “What is left for the politically powerful in 
nation-states to do, is to perform well in their global homework.” (Narr 2001, p. 55) This 
“homework” necessarily ties them even closer into the logic of the actors who are deter-
mining the direction. 
With the “displacement of the political by the market” (Habermas 1998, p. 120) the public 
hand loses access to the resources which are needed to shape the common good and to 
establish the social conditions necessary for broad political participation. The new global 
rules systematically liberate the political class from their obligation to serve the needs 
of the citizens, to the advantage of the so-called global players. Simultaneously, there is 
a clear shift of key decision-making to little transparent, power-structured bodies which 
are not linked to the democratic process. The results of decision-making processes within 
the framework of the nation-state aimed at preserving specifi c structures and goods, or at 
protecting norms, standards, principles, values, and participation rights, are increasingly 
attacked as ʻmarket distortionsʼ, ʻlocation disadvantages,  ʼor ʻineffi cienciesʼ.
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2 Global governance and democracy 
If globalisation is to be directed into sustainable channels, then in accordance with our 
initial hypothesis, democracy must be rethought and reshaped. Liberal parliamentary 
democracy, the rights of the citizens to be able to (co-) decide on their own affairs in the 
private as well as the public sphere, has previously been bound to the nation-state. Rule 
of law and legality in public affairs are on the whole linked to statehood. If people are 
encouraged as “important actors in sustainable development” (Schröder 2002) to enter 
into “broader societal communication” (ibid, p. 54) and active participation, then the 
question is what should be their relationship to each other, to the common good, and the 
community, and which approaches should they adopt under the conditions of globali-
sation. How are the community, gender relations, natural foundations of life, technical 
progress, social connectivity and societal responsibility to be dealt with in a global con-
text with porous borders? The agenda therefore includes a systematic, critical review of 
the role of political systems and institutions in the globalisation process, and their demo-
cratic permeability; and also a process of (self)-reassurance regarding the participatory 
interests and options open to the citizens, and the normative orientations which direct the 
whole process and which are to become effective in it.
The globalisation process, sustainable development, the spaces for shaping democracy 
and gender justice are still rarely considered in conjunction with each other. They are 
usually treated in separate discourses. If an analysis of globalisation touches on gender 
relations it usually remains restricted to consideration of the effects of the systemic dis-
crimination of women and of the burdens they have to bear.   
Against this background, we fi rst outline the political dimension of sustainability in a glo-
bal context and then consider the opportunities offered for democratic openings including 
the dimension of gender democracy2. We also attempt to outline a concept of political 
action which does not deal in hindsight with gender inequality after this has been gener-
ated (or tolerated), but which aspires to integrate gender justice right from the start. 
2.1 Critical consideration of a political model 
The concept of global governance is becoming more and more widely accepted, and acts 
as a reference point for a range of modes of political action in a global context, with vary-
ing contours and connotations. Only partially linked to this is the recently revived debate 
on the crisis of representative democracy, in the context of which enhanced models of 
2 No satisfactory consensus has yet been reached about the concept of gender democracy in either public 
or academic debate. It remains as a sign of incomplete democracy in terms of gender politics, and a 
call to action. It is used in this sense here. 
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civil society participation are investigated. Lively debates about participation are being 
conducted at the general political level, and in various fi elds of politics. Also addressing 
all political fi elds, gender mainstreaming is to be understood as the attempt to reduce the 
asymmetry in political and social spheres in the sense of gender democracy and gender 
equality.  
In 1994 the Commission on Global Governance submitted a report containing a design of 
politics in the global sphere which in Germany is drawn on by the Foundation for Devel-
opment and Peace (SEF) and the associated Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) 
at the University of Duisburg – here in particular Franz Nuscheler and Dirk Messner 
(Messner/Nuscheler 2003). They also draw implicitly on the reformulation of political 
action by James N. Rosenaus and David Held, which is based on a spatial continuum 
between nationhood and internationality (Rosenau 1992, Held 1995). As member of the 
Commission (Nuscheler) and contributor to its work (Messner) this line of discussion fed 
directly into their concept of  global governance. 
The need for global governance is based here on the growth of trans-boundary problems 
and the need, in accordance with a social market economy, to protect, maintain and secure 
public goods at the global level, as well as to work against the undesirable effects of 
globalisation and unrestrained externalisation. In general, it is assumed that the growing 
“pressure of problems caused by the rising transaction costs for non-cooperative actions 
will lead to the gradualist construction and expansion of global governance.” (Nuscheler 
2000, p. 155) The multilateralism resulting from the pressure of problems necessarily has 
an anti-hegemonial tendency, which is certainly intended.  
As generally used in Germany, the concept of global governance has three characteris-
tics. 
1. It is concerned with regaining state agency, with re-conquering the stateʼs mandate 
and power to shape politics, rather than the withdrawal of this power. 
2. Global governance represents a new political model, in which various governmental 
and non-governmental, corporate and civil society actors cooperate systematically 
towards joint solutions for problems within a variety of network settings. 
3. Globalisation must be guided and supported by a basic minimal ethical consensus as 
embodied in human rights agreements and the UN Charter, with their claim to univer-
sality. 
However, the Global Governance architecture has a democracy problem, as its propo-
nents concede (Messner/Nuscheler 2000, p. 180 f.). There is a broad consensus in the 
debate that one reason for this is that parliamentary democracy is historically (and pos-
sibly also systematically) linked to the nation-state, and with the erosion of the latter it too 
loses ground. The systematic preference given to private undertakings (codes of conduct, 
global compacts) over state regulation, once again undermines the core of state responsi-
bility which could still be susceptible to the infl uence of the citizenry. Subjectively, people 
are unlikely to feel their interests are represented in international negotiations. National 
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parliaments have little infl uence anyway on such rounds of negotiations. And along with 
democratic rights and procedures, human rights can also easily be endangered. 
2.2 Responses …
In the debate on global governance, reference is frequently made to the role of civil soci-
ety. The complexity of the challenges to be resolved, interdependencies between prob-
lems and areas of impact, and not least the intensifi ed demands for participation and the 
increased level of citizens  ʼ organisations have led, it is argued, to the growth of civil 
society as an agent in its own right which has managed to acquire a voice outside the 
established procedures of the political system. Whether “civil society” actors are taken to 
include private business, as in the system of the United Nations, or (as is more generally 
the case) solely to include non-profi t organisations and social movements – their engage-
ment is generally viewed as a considerable gain for democracy, or by some even as a 
response to the unresolved “democratic question” within the global governance strategy. 
We have our doubts. Setting state and civil society up in opposition to one another presup-
poses a separation of the locus of political power which is not immediately plausible. The 
process of restructuring public and private spheres and the acceptance of this by society 
(albeit reluctantly) hardly seems to be clear evidence of such a dichotomy. Furthermore, 
the contrasting assumes that there are no effective axes of dominance working within 
civil society and within the so-called private sphere. Finally, it also assumes that the 
topics addressed by the political process, such as in our case the conceptualisation and 
management of nature and the environment, are not themselves also products of social 
construction. 
In the following we will initially pick up two threads of the socio-political argumentation 
regarding democratic theory for reconsideration and reconstruction. 
• Representatives of what is generally labelled as “globalisation critique” have carefully 
studied the concept of global governance, especially as conceptualised in the German 
debate, and with a view to developing a theory of democracy have emphasised the 
underlying concept of the political. Social scientists oriented towards a new reading 
of Antonio Gramsci call into question the liberal construction of a dichotomy between 
the market sphere and the political sphere. For them, economics is politics, and the 
organisation of the markets and the relations of production is itself the result of politi-
cal processes and decisions. The link between both spheres, they conclude, can hardly 
be seen as allowing correction or limitation imposed from the “world of politics” on 
the “world of economics”. 
• Feminist theoreticians have taken up the concept of global governance because of its 
openness in the direction of civil society and have worked intensively on the possi-
ble inclusion of gender political considerations of political action in newly projected 
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democratic forms. At the same time, their political agenda includes as a key the recla-
mation of the private as political. 
Both theoretical approaches centre on the re-determination and re-conceptualisation of 
the political sphere, which forms the core of the global governance debate. They see their 
responses as invitations to engage in further theoretical debate and it is precisely in this 
function that we will proceed to explore them. 
2.2.1  … from a neo-Gramscian perspective
Essentially, two objections are raised from the neo-Gramscian perspective against the 
concept of global governance, but these weigh heavily. After considering these criticisms 
we will present elements of the neo-Gramscian theory on which this critique is based. 
The concept of global governance is based on a view of politics which excludes power 
and interest structures between actors and groups. Furthermore it puts an undefi ned world 
ethics in the place of democratic legitimisation, transparency and accountability. The crit-
icism can be explained on the basis of the cornerstones of the global governance strategy, 
on the role played by problem pressure, civil society, forms of regulation, and ethics. 
Most concepts of global governance assume some objective problem pressure, which 
impacts across boundaries. It creates new interdependencies between states and at the 
same time increasingly undermines the problem-solving capacity of individual states. 
ʻFinding  ʼthe ʻright  ʼsolution appears more a matter of information and implementation 
commensurate with given complexities, with the state at the most involved in moderating 
between interests. Key questions are not raised: who has a problem, when and why, who 
is able to gain attention in the public arena for their problems and defi nitions of the situa-
tion and get these included in the problem processing catalogue, who and by which mech-
anism is involved in the elaboration of problem solving strategies, and who and in which 
form partakes in implementation processes? It is also implied that unresolved problems, 
e.g. environmental concerns or matters of social and gender injustice are essentially due 
to a loss of the capacity for state control, and not, attributable to social structures or the 
related dominant economic and political strategies. In other words, political rule is not 
seen as a factor.  
However, the Final Report of the Study Commission is much more differentiated than the 
critiqued highly technocratic defi nition of global challenges. “Clear hierarchical relations 
and one-sided dependency” (Enquete 2002, p. 416) the report states, indicate that the 
concept of interdependency may not be all that suitable. Global problems “may be due to 
a number of widely differing causes, fundamentally different interests and options may 
have to be distinguished. There may be common as well as diverging interests” (ibid). 
And the Final Report also at least takes note that problems can be viewed from the per-
spective of those wielding power but also of the powerless, and that “solutions” may well 
turn out the very opposite. 
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Despite this, though, the effects of the globalisation processes are then summarily classed 
as changes to the form of the nation state. This goes hand in hand with a change in form 
of politics. The state acts as hub and moderator, as interface and interdependency man-
ager. Governance becomes a matter of regulating. The corporate and the social world, 
grouped together as private actors with little differentiation in terms of “logic of action 
and problem-solving” are equally at its disposition. New forms, not new contents are the 
key, necessary changes in political direction are eclipsed, and it is to be feared that the 
networks and extra-institutional negotiations of the actors leave little room for democratic 
control (cf. Scherrer 2000, Huffschmid/Brunnengräber 2001). In fact, though, the reor-
ganisation of the state apparatus, which presents itself as a management process adequate 
for the complexities involved, actually serves the functional requirements of neoliberal 
globalisation (Francisco et al. 2000). 
The undifferentiated melange of non-governmental actors, corporate  and social world 
summarily are classed as representing civil society with properties such as “autonomous, 
emancipatory, integrative, consensus-oriented” (Schade 2002, p. 3), and declared the 
agents of democratic voice and control in the global sphere. Against all evidence of power-
related political entanglement the contrasting of government and non-government is still 
extensively maintained. What is termed ʻglobal civil society  ʼconsists, in fact, of neo-cor-
porative, transnationally institutionalised structures without democratic legitimisation, or 
suffi cient transparency (Huffschmid/Brunnengräber 2001). Not only is there no discussion 
of the very different historical, political and social phases and contexts in which the oppo-
sition of “state world” and “social world” emanated and acquired new social and political 
meaning, but the corresponding theories are not placed in context. No reference is made to 
the major debates on democracy and co-determination in the private business sector.  
Instead of acknowledging the problems in the context of an analysis of power relations 
and taking into consideration social contradictions, confl icts, and diverging interests, as 
well as the causes of unequal global opportunities, there is the call for a global ethos of 
responsibility or world ethics. Though it is not the intention of the proponents of global 
governance to skim over the systemic lack of mechanisms of social equalisation and dem-
ocratic procedure, “the demands for a normative ʻworld ethos  ʼ“ (Paech 2001, 22, Brand 
et al. 2000) and resultant responsibilities do run the risk of facing profound inequalities 
and confl icts of interests merely with pleas to voluntary insight. At best such mechanisms 
are recognised as tools for effi ciency and stability-oriented management. 
As indicated, the protagonists of global governance themselves concede that there are 
unresolved problems of democracy and legitimisation. But since they see threats to 
democracy as resulting mainly from the dissolution of national borders, they fi nd them-
selves in the dilemma of taking as ex post-reference a supposedly satisfactorily function-
ing democracy in the past, and as a consequence seeking solutions primarily through 
transnational cooperation aimed at reconstructing state functions. They hope that by thus 
regaining scope for political agency they will be able to counteract defi cits in democratic 
participation and legitimisation through increased effectiveness. They have no strategies 
as such for democratisation.
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These are the major points of departure for the school of thought following Antonio Gram-
sci. The power analysis of neo-Gramscian theory points beyond the fi xation on changes to 
the institutional form of the political in that it also takes into consideration the constitu-
tion of the broader social context within which globalisation processes move and exert 
pressure for change on the organisation of the political system. The resultant systematic 
critique of political power owes much to an understanding of scientifi c action which 
examines the on-going transformation process and the associated restructuring of the 
political space both for the driving forces and for signs of rupture. This takes place in the 
hope of being able to glean the substance for emancipation. But the authors linked more 
or less closely to Gramsci would be the fi rst to acknowledge that the ʻneo-Gramscian 
approach  ʼis a construction site under an inspiring name rather than a fi nished structure.  
Regarding the political-economic aspects of their framework, approaches situated in 
Gramsciʼs tradition rely heavily on premises framed by regulation theory. When estab-
lishing the basic concepts of political agency and democracy, a systematic link is forged 
which avoids polarisations, dichotomies, and divisions, and which offers an opportunity 
for the critique of power. The thematic focuses and approaches vary considerably, com-
ing from democratic theory (e.g. Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe), from economics (e.g. 
Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz), state theory (e.g. Joachim Hirsch), or from the debate on 
social movements (e.g. Roland Roth, Alex Demirovic). A common theme to the social 
scientists inspired by a re-reading of Gramsci is a critical examination of Marxʼs concept 
of the political. But while they reject Gramsciʼs frequently determinist and economistic 
narrowing which may already be found with Marx (cf. Görg 1994, Bruch/Krebs 1996), 
they adhere all the more fi rmly to the critique of power. In contrast to the concept of 
regulating with its technical approach to problem-solving, the concept of regulation inte-
grates social and political power. On the basis of a concept of structure from historical 
materialism, the question shared by them is: By what means and to what extent will it 
be possible to stabilise institutionally the basically crisis-ridden dynamics of capitalist 
socialisation? And in the context of our discussion: What part is played by the glo-
bal governance discourse? (Brand 2003) Most of the authors engaging in this discourse 
insist on a rationality and dynamics of social actors sui generis, which does not permit 
the reduction of  strategies and actions to functions arising in or deriving from a social 
context. This means that considerable importance is attached to cultural dimensions, 
lifestyles, consumptive norms, customs and habits, common sense, and performative and 
representational acts.
Globalisation is understood here as the articulation of an historical struggle for a new, 
post-Fordist capitalist accumulation regime. It brings businesses, state and civil society 
into a new relationship with one another, involving cooperative strategies which are also 
typical of networks. This process is not really one of ʻless stateʼ, but rather a change to 
the form and function of state action, which in the fi nal analysis is oriented towards main-
taining profi table capitalist conditions of reproduction. Through the ʻfree operation of 
market forcesʼ, unconditional priority of international competitiveness and economic effi -
ciency dictate the major guidelines for political and social action. Saskia Sassen speaks in 
this context of “denationalised state agendas and privatised norm-making” (Sassen 2000, 
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p. 395), and draws thereby attention to the on-going fundamental transformation process 
of the presence: 
“[that] comes from the world of private power yet installs itself in the public 
realm and in so doing contributes to de-nationalise what has been historically 
constructed as national state agendas. […] This brings with it strengthened 
possibilities of norm-making in the interests of the few rather than the majority.” 
(ibid., p. 393 and 397)
Although the formation of social relationships and institutions is to some extent independ-
ent of a mechanical profi t logic, it nevertheless remains directed overall to the demands of 
capitalist accumulation. “Economy itself is understood as a socially constructed and insti-
tutionally embedded relationship and not as an independent social sphere (market)subject 
to political regulation” (Brand et al. 2000, p. 50). 
To this extent, the idea of a rudderless market, whose actors should be embedded like 
recalled sorcererʼs apprentices, is regarded as inappropriate. The nation state, its institu-
tional system and its actions by no means disappear in the process of privatisation and 
economisation of living conditions, but merely undergo a transformation to a “national 
competition-state” (Hirsch 1995). And politics certainly does not disappear, although it 
may be so disguised as to be unrecognisable. But it may no longer be subject to demo-
cratic infl uence and control. The selective neo-liberal withdrawal of state action could all 
too easily suggest that the political in general is vanishing. In actual fact it is primarily 
welfare state control and service functions which are being curtailed, whereas discipli-
nary functions and the parts of the state apparatus responsible for adjustment to ʻexternal  ʼ
requirements become more important, nationally and internationally. Therefore the dual 
privatisation and the limitation of the scope for political state control (and indeed also 
the central orientation of globalisation policies to secure private property by means of 
establishing national and international norms) is fundamentally political. The widespread 
claims that there is no alternative only serve to highlight the close ties between the state 
and the social forces propelling globalisation and the revised state agenda. Therefore, 
corporate globalisation must be understood from the beginning as a political process and 
not as a hopelessly asymmetric face-off between a powerful economy and powerless 
politics. 
Gramsci and those following this tradition also have a fundamentally different defi nition 
of civil society. Gramsci distinguishes between “civil society”, i.e. the ensemble of organ-
isms commonly called private, and “political society”, which is directly linked to state 
power. Civil society does not represent a normative factor and a social instance constitut-
ing its own sphere in opposition to the state sphere, which is approached by a state under 
pressure from globalisation and other problems with the intention of winning additional 
resources of competence and legitimacy. Rather, civil society is used as an analytical 
category and is understood as forming part of the general political arena in which various 
axes of power are located, each extending into the state apparatus, or being regulated and 
infl uenced by it, a space, that is, within which power relationships, confl icts and contra-
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dictions extending into the state apparatus can be negotiated and resolved. This perspec-
tive does not preclude a certain independence of plural worlds of everyday life, charac-
terised by pre-political elements. Civil society therefore defi nitely does not constitute a 
sphere opposite to political power, but is a political societal arena in which consensus is 
generated for the existing order, or, as the case may be, for an alternative order.   
In this reading, Gramsciʼs concept of hegemony, according to which the power-conform-
ing consensus is anchored in the civil society itself, is of central importance. Hegemony 
designates the power visibly bundled in the political directorate as reaching directly into 
the civil society. It means a dominance which seeks to secure political, intellectual, cul-
tural, and moral backing, and which can also rely on approval, recognition, and consensus 
in particular where its substance is political rule. At the same time its strength lies in what 
Borg calls its “decentral methodological structure” (Borg 2001, p. 69), its renunciation of 
an Archimedean point of social developments in favour of the fl uid interaction between 
constellations of interests and social power relations, within which certain behavioural 
requirements and attributions of meaning gain dominance. The concept also requires 
no stringent rational correspondence. Hegemonial projects may well be oriented to the 
future, without having yet found their ʻwindow of opportunityʼ, and in the absence of the 
acceptance indispensably inherent to the concept of hegemony they might never do so. 
In summary, the reorganisation of state functions and the transition from government to 
governance is not the reaction, as it were, to external or objective pressure from problems, 
but to the changing demands of capitalist reproduction. The reorientation of the logic of 
the state apparatus towards securing a competitive location and systemic viability in the 
face of competition, to the detriment of the common good and societal interests, poses 
a severe threat to the received form of parliamentary democracy. Important elements of 
globalisation combine with individual institutional areas at the national level and de-
nationalise the political content of state action. Deregulation and privatisation change the 
structures by means of which people can call their government to account. The economic 
and political weight of global players and the dynamics of the various levels of politics 
further limit the democratic space open for public political activities on the part of the 
citizens. Conversely, it is also necessary again to examine critically which interests are 
represented in state actions (Sassen 2000).
Nonetheless, since core functions of statehood, in particular the monopoly of the legiti-
mate use of physical force (Max Weber) and the creation of social cohesion will remain 
for the time-being within the framework of the nation state, it still remains necessary to 
establish and secure the preconditions for a democratic shaping of globalisation primarily 
at the national level. This holds true even when the corresponding conditions which make 
a relative social equalisation possible in the fi rst place are increasingly being undermined. 
Here the critics of the dominant understanding of global governance are in agreement. 
However, they accuse the conventional view of failing to go beyond a “mere regulation 
of capitalist society” (Görg/Hirsch 1998, p. 319) and thus necessarily failing to satisfy the 
demand for a democratic shaping of globalisation.  
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2.2.2  … and from a feminist perspective
All too often the existence of gender arrangements escapes the analytical and activity-
 oriented exploration of the major issues of politics and society. This repeated ʻoverlook-
ing  ʼof socially constructed gender identities and of gender-relations as institutionalised 
structural features of social life is all the more remarkable because at least the existence, 
if not the effects of gender arrangements ought to be apparent to everybody from their 
daily life. Regarding these “blind spots” (Sassen 1999) to the gender orders effective in 
all societies and the inherent systematic discrimination of women, feminist social science 
research with its critical analyses over the last three decades has broken the silence on gen-
der dominance. It has collected knowledge and evidence from society and politics which 
indicates the need for a fundamental review of the received concepts of the  political.3 
There is now extensive literature providing evidence of the impact of gender relations 
on the formation of personal identity and relationships, and recognising gender orders as 
integral elements of social practices and institutions. Feminist research and theory forma-
tion have covered and explored all levels of the political. It continues to scrutinise how 
the specifi c construction and reproduction of the meaning of “maleness” and “female-
ness” are maintained. It focuses its attention mainly on the question how everyday life 
realities fi nd their way into political action, what is ascribed to the political sphere, and 
the extent to which there is systematic correspondence between political structures with 
social inclusion or exclusion. The re-examination of the political sphere and the funda-
mental review of its structuration, have long been a part of the feminist discourse (excel-
lent overviews are provided by Becker-Schmidt/Knapp 2000, and Braun et al. 2000). 
Globalisation topics 
The scrutiny of the gender-coded division into public and private spheres, which fi rst and 
foremost forms part of the steps and topics of re-examining the political space, reaches 
back into the early formulations of feminist theory. Associated with this division is the 
systematic under-valuation of the private sphere and its subordination under the public 
sphere. Both are assigned their own ethical concepts. Another topic with a long tradition 
in particular in the feminist literature in German-speaking countries is the international 
political economy. This originated from development research and North-South relations, 
and the work of the  “Bielefeld School” on the relationship between subsistence and 
market-oriented production (Bennholdt-Thomsen 1981. v. Werlhof u.a. 1993). Since the 
fi rst experience with neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes in the countries of the 
Global South, committed social critique has developed into feminist political economics 
(Bakker 1994, Elson 1995). The analysis is always directed at the gendered interaction 
between state and market and public and private households. This is no different for the 
more recent approaches to the care economy (Razavi 1999). They have originated on the 
3 Feminism covers a wide range of theoretical approaches with the common normative goal of gender 
equality and the recognition of gender-differentiated living situations.
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basis of a variety of analyses on the curtailment of the welfare state which affect women in 
particular, and the renewed invisibility of womenʼs reproductive work in the family. The 
debates in the international womenʼs movements and the relevance of universal human 
rights for women have been studied frequently and comprehensively (Joachim 1999, 
v. Braunmühl 2001). In addition, the research on social movements has taken up from 
the practices of the womenʼs and environmental movements the question of the effective-
ness of norms, which in turn bring supposedly private topics such as  violence, torture or 
abortion into the public and political sphere (Brabandt et al. 2002). This eventually led to 
the question of the substantial changes to the struggle for historical achievements such as 
civil rights in times of de-nationalisation, whichever form it takes (Sassen, Zürn), as well 
as to issues of an increasingly interacting cultural multiplicity.  
Finally and of particular interest in the context of ʻsustainable governanceʼ, are the deci-
sive impulses from the womenʼs movements for refl ection on an understanding of science 
which all too easily falls victim to technocracy and presumptuousness. Since the mid-
1980s there have been extensive discussions in the international womenʼs movements 
on environmental concerns and technological developments as well as on gender-struc-
tured approaches to science. Together with feminist scholars of natural sciences and sci-
ence theory they analyse strategies to oppose the “Earth Follies” (Seager 1993) with an 
“Alliance for the future” (Dankelmann/Davidson 1988). By the time of the Rio Confer-
ence 1992, an extensive repertoire of knowledge had been built as well as very effective 
methods of organising. At all subsequent conferences, such as the recent conference in 
Johannesburg on sustainable development, skilfully elaborated texts with specifi c recom-
mendations have been presented (e.g. WEDO 2002). 
The topics mentioned can be readily identifi ed as belonging to the core issues of the glo-
balisation debate. They all form part of the decades-long efforts in womenʼs politics to 
redefi ne the political sphere. Specifi cally the debates within and between the international 
womenʼs movements with their shared human rights frame of reference, which has been 
elaborated transversing many steps and differentiations and has been spelled out in the 
normative goals of social justice, sustainability and peace, have contributed signifi cantly 
to the formation of a political globality. Nevertheless, the dominant discourse in Ger-
man-speaking countries refers at best in short asides to the results of gender research and 
the debates of the international womenʼs movements. Literally on the other side, femi-
nist social scientists once again study the mainstream attentively and knowledgeable, but 
with limited expectations for linkage points for transformatory politics (Holland-Cunz/
Ruppert 2000). Would it not be desirable to reach beyond such asymmetric communica-
tion? 
Searching for the reasons for the systematic invisibility of women in the thought con-
structs of main-stream society and politics, feminist theory soon identifi ed the importance 
of the prevailing division into a public and a private sphere, with the public sphere hav-
ing male connotations, and the declaration of the private sphere as the realm of women. 
These ascriptions are linked with different ethical concepts and emotional forms, and 
each is coupled to gender images and social divisions of labour. Feminists have analysed 
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in depth the way in which the liberal concept of the separation of public and private and 
the construction of a gender-neutral legal subject systematically results in unequal gender 
differentials in terms of the full development of civil rights. They have broken down the 
barriers of the domestic sphere as an area beyond the law, primarily in terms of domestic 
violence. And they have shown how through social conditioning the inner access to the 
newly conquered areas of equality will always remain precarious.  
The central motto of the new womenʼs movement is succinct: “The private is political”. 
The prevalence of male dominant structures is based on the exclusion and denigration 
of the non-public, the spaces of living and working of women. Feminists have critiqued 
the dominant political edifi ce of thought, which excludes the private sphere ascribed to 
women from the public discourse as non-political, and they demand the recall of the “pri-
vate” in the political into the public sphere. At the same time they draw attention to the 
contradiction that the liberal state does in fact treat the family as a public institution, and 
has very specifi c ideas about its form and practices which underlie very concrete politi-
cal and legal regulations. Feminist theory adopts an increasingly differentiated approach 
to the social mechanisms which reproduce binary gender constructions and the proc-
esses which establish these in daily language and imagery, which then in turn provide 
the material for a gender order which fi xes the inequality (Dackweiler 1995). This leads 
to a gendered division of democracy (Holland-Cunz 1998), the unacceptability of which 
is emphasised by the term ʻgender democracyʼ. In other words, the new womenʼs move-
ment is primarily concerned with the re-determination of what should be regarded as 
politically relevant.  
At the core of the neo-liberal project of globalisation lies the shifting of the boundaries 
between the public and private, a shift of a very different kind from that raised in feminist 
discourse, but closely related to this. The progressive “de-nationalisation of economy and 
society” (Lang 2001, p. 94), which we have called “dual privatisation”, is associated with 
the attempt to relocate womenʼs “core competences” back to the family or to communal 
care work. This strategy is rarely referred to in public as the offl oading of costs, which it 
in fact is, but rather as the reconnection with neglected female desires and living spaces. 
We thus witness the risk of “relocation of socio-political debates in the private sphere of 
individual concepts and options for action” (ibid.) – a process which is supported by neo-
liberal ideas of individualism. 
It turns out that the actual course of the shift of the societal boundary immanent in the 
neo-liberal project depends to a large extent on the way in which gender constructions 
and gender orders of globalisation processes are registered and changed, and on how men 
and women position and defi ne themselves in these changes. In terms of gender policy, 
this also raises the question whether the received conceptual instruments are suitable 
to generate solutions adequate for problem-solving and given situations. Therefore  the 
need and at the same time the opportunity pose themselves to develop an inclusive con-
cept of the political, one which outlines the requirements for the democratic structuring 
of sustainability in a globalised context and which in its transformatory perspective also 
addresses the re-ordering of gender relations. 
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Global governance with potential for women sʼ politics? 
With some reservations, feminist theoreticians see links to the global governance debate. 
There are two main reasons: 
• The normative approach, the signifi cance of human rights and the value orientation 
which the civil society plays a key role in formulating offer the opportunity to connect 
with the feminist debate on womenʼs rights as human rights. 
• The concepts of social and political action contained more or less explicitly in global 
governance and the proposals for a new concept of democracy in a global world are 
in principle socially anchored and transcend boundaries, and as such are open for the 
positions and convictions of the international womenʼs movements. 
In her report for the Study Commission, Ilse Lenz comments: “Global governance and the 
new transnational network structures raise the question of democratic representation and 
political responsibility, because the mechanisms from the national framework will not 
be effective in an international framework and will have to be developed further.” And 
she adds in a footnote: “Global governance could offer a highly-interesting experimental 
fi eld in gender politics for new forms of democracy such as participatory and deliberative 
approaches.” (Lenz 2002, p. 78 f.) For years, feminist analysts have been studying the 
extent to which globalisation processes “completely reconfi gure economic, social, politi-
cal and symbolic spheres at local, national and transnational levels […] leading as a result 
to new gender-specifi c forms of individualisation and politicisation” (Appelt/Sauer 2001, 
p. 130). In other words, they are primarily interested in examining the extent to which the 
democracy problems raised by the restructuring of the political sphere offer potential for 
gender-political transformation goals. 
It is not surprising that feminist theoreticians soon found themselves drawn to the concept 
of global governance. Their starting point is: 
“the social transformation of the political as a doubly unavoidable project 
within the framework of neo-liberal globalisation. Unavoidable fi rstly because 
the process of globalisation generates social transformations and among other 
things fundamentally changes the political arena. But also unavoidable because 
the quality of these changes makes a comprehensive social treatment, i.e. social 
responses to globalisation […] essential both for factual and for ethical-moral 
reasons” (Ruppert 1998, p. 95). 
From the start there was criticism of the idealising view of the “global civil society” or 
“social world”, blind to gender democracy, as well as of the static global governance 
architecture with its stylised column structure, in contrast to which there were calls for 
open-ended  communicative and participatory processes (Ruf 1997). This is, however, 
by no means regarded as the only suitable approach. Seen as a strategy for international 
social regulation, global governance may well prove to be empirically open and process-
oriented as well as amenable to normative gender-democratic postulates (Lenz 2001). The 
questions introduced from a feminist perspective are e.g.: what should global negotiation 
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systems and processes look like in order to have a good chance of being able to achieve 
feminist goals? Which institutional arrangements of democratic process offer feminists 
opportunities for intervention?  
The feminist intervention in the debate can draw on the discourses and practices devel-
oped to the fullest and to a highly professional level during the UN Decade of Women 
(1975–85) and in the series of conferences of the United Nations on the major topics of 
humanity in the 1990s. Local feminist discourse and practices have long since transna-
tionalised. The international womenʼs movements, on the basis of consolidating human 
rights-based arguments, have developed logics of identity and solidarity which are rightly 
ascribed the quality of a global civil society (Alvarez 2000). With the self-perception 
of having set out to achieve the full democratisation of every-day life, the international 
womenʼs movements can indeed point to relevant process experience. Those with a femi-
nist perspective entering into the global governance debate do so “under the aspect of 
redefi ning the original liberal idea of steering in a comprehensive emancipatory project” 
(Ruppert 1998, p. 95, also Ruppert 2002).
Opening the agenda
In important points the majority of feminist theories draw on the discussion of the rela-
tionship between state and civil society infl uenced by Gramsci and continue this in their 
own critique of patriarchy. They criticise post-Fordist regulation approaches because 
these privilege the male ʻnormal working relationships  ʼand neglect gender-specifi c role 
ascriptions. However, they do not view these weaknesses as being systematic, but rather 
see them as avoidable one-sided formulations (Ruf 1997). The critique of power inherent 
in the concept of civil society and a societal defi nition of the political space which is not 
limited to the public sphere open up opportunities to include patriarchal hegemonial rela-
tions integrally in the debate. It is not necessary to introduce these as a separate element. 
By taking up the Gramscian concept of hegemony, the actions and self-perceptions of 
the international womenʼs movements can be viewed as the termination of the consensus 
within which women had previously been operating more or less without question. The 
withdrawal of legitimisation from the patriarchal hegemonial consensus represents an 
historical-cultural caesura, which is to be defended once again within the globalisation 
process.  
It is not surprising that feminist theoreticians (e.g. Benhabib, Butler, Holland-Cunz) have 
participated actively in the debate on citizenship in the context of globalisation and cul-
tural differentiation in local and national spheres. There are a number of approaches with a 
gender-specifi c version of citizenship at their centre. Firstly, with this analytical  category 
the gender-specifi c inequality in citizenship is scrutinised. And secondly, it is used with the 
normative intent of formulating a concept of the political process which is in a position to 
secure the fundamental postulates of human rights and democracy. It is thus increasingly 
at the centre of normative discourses in which core questions regarding the protection and 
extension of rights and expectations for which the womenʼs movements have worked for 
decades at national and international levels. At the same time it also represents an attempt 
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to go beyond the corporatist concept of participatory democracy which characterises the 
global governance debate. The conditions for democratic political communication are a 
particular focal point, and as a result these approaches tend towards a concept of delib-
erative democracy. In contrast to liberal and also neo-Gramscian views of civil society, 
following Habermas, civil society is located outside the privately constituted levels of 
labour, capital, and commodity markets, in the sphere of the world of everyday life. Here 
a democratic potential can be recruited in a process of deliberative politics which acts into 
the global sphere. 
The gender-coding of the public and the private terrain brought out by feminist analysts 
brings patriarchal ascriptions, justifi cations, and norms onto the agenda, which can be dis-
cussed directly and on an equal footing within the framework of a critique of hegemony 
inspired by Gramsci. The questions raised in the debate on democratic theory regarding 
the premises and implications for the organisation of society in gender coded and dichot-
omised public and private spaces and the constitution of gender relations in both spaces 
equally orients the analysis along an, as it were, continuous axis of critique of power and 
subordination. At the same time, as mentioned, it shares the premise that the implications 
of globalisation processes reaching far into everyday life also – specifi cally because of 
the concomitant debate on new and adequate orders and norms – open up opportunities 
for the re-determination of the social meaning of gender-identities and gender relations. 
To this extent from a feminist standpoint “engendering global politics” represents an 
indispensable and permanent aspect of global politics. Conversely, from the perspectives 
of women politics and feminism, it is possible to establish lines of argumentation and ori-
entations which can provide promising crystallisation points for a concept of democratic 
political action in the global arena as well as for the contours of corresponding institu-
tions. They may prove much more suited to show the way to political results which in 
terms both of democratic theory and strategy provide more justice, and also more gender 
justice. Chapter 4 will outline some such refl ections. Before that, however, the follow-
ing chapter will address the tension between globalisation and sustainability as well as 
the orientation towards the common good endangered by the present-day globalisation 
process, a topic which has recently re-entered the debate by way of the newly emerging 
discussion on global public goods.
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3 Global Governance and sustainability 
As important as the concept of global governance may be in view of the international 
problems, and as correct as the involvement of civil society may be, the approach of the 
Study Commission nevertheless shows two weaknesses. Firstly, it adopts a defensive 
stance where it leaves the dominance of the international markets untouched. The political 
project is intended solely to help to remove negative economic, social and environmental 
trends, without considering the dynamic which gives rise to them. Secondly, the refer-
ences to a minimum ethical consensus, to undertakings by businesses, or to “soft institu-
tions” are scarcely suited to oppose the neoliberally dominated globalisation processes 
with a political approach with a substantial democratic content. It would be like trying to 
divert an approaching avalanche past environmentally and socially sensitive locations by 
means of a social dialogue. Furthermore, the debates on global governance and sustain-
ability have so far proceeded along markedly different tracks. Whereas the governance 
debate concentrates on the problem of political control in the globalisation process and 
the associated democracy defi cits, the sustainability debate addresses in particular envi-
ronmental load capacities and, in part, questions of justice. But the two debates are rarely 
linked with each other.  
The sustainability debate ignited by the problem of limits (to natural resources and load 
capacities, in part also to the extent of domination of nature), as well as by the resultant 
need to reduce the use of natural resources. It centred on the problem of justice, both inter-
nationally and between generations. Initially, the debate often included critical and eman-
cipatory contributions aimed at bringing the overexploitation of nature and the neglect 
of aspects of justice into connection with a reformulation of social natural relationships. 
Over time, however, more and more strategies have established themselves which aim 
to introduce new developments while retaining old rationalities. Nature is viewed within 
the framework of “ strong sustainability” (see e.g. Victor, 1991 and Minsch et al. 1996) 
as worthy of protection as the basis for human production, but only in its property as a 
resource which should continue to be available for exploitation. This reduces nature to 
its economic utility. Within the context of “weak sustainability” there is no reason why 
nature should not be replaced using technology so that the ability for natural regeneration 
and reproduction are no longer needed and no longer have to be taken into considera-
tion.
The modern control over nature is hardly called into question, as if the dominance over 
nature were only the basis for social welfare and social space and therefore should not 
be called into question. But a critical review of social relationships to nature show that 
domination over nature also marks and structures society as a whole. This means that in 
particular with respect to sustainability it is necessary to scrutinise enlightenment and the 
social contracts resulting from it. Sustainable governance, if it wishes to be more than 
just an environmental policy providing support for globalisation processes, not only has 
to resolve the problem of which globalisation should be sustainable, but also which pat-
terns of rationality govern the defi cits in democracy which are related to globalisation 
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and sustainability. We approach this question initially at the theoretical level and focus on 
approaches to global environmental management. We then discuss the problem of domi-
nance over nature, before fi nally considering the concept of global public goods.
3.1 Global governance and global environmental management 
The mere fact that the discussion of globalisation in German-speaking countries has so 
far used the English term “governance”, without having its own suitable equivalent, in 
itself signals the need for a restructuring and redetermination of political structures. At 
the same time, there are widespread discussions about how globalisation processes trans-
form economic, environmental, social, political and symbolic spheres at local, national 
and transnational levels. 
In this process, governance has from the start had a double face. On the one hand, it 
allows new forms of politics in a situation in which the old ones are no longer suffi cient, 
and thus opens up opportunities for new negotiation processes. On the other hand, as 
already mentioned, its policies threaten to come off the rails where the public matters and 
common goods are increasingly made the responsibility of private business. A concept 
of sustainable governance cannot involve simply extracting the best possible undertaking 
from private actors to provide minimum protection for the environment. Rather there is a 
need to use as orientation some form of “social contract” which covers both social nature 
relationships and gender justice.
However, it is hardly possible to achieve sustainability when defi ning only economic, 
environmental and social goals. This triangle lacks from the start the political dimension, 
which is essential to integrate sustainability or sustainability strategies in the living sphere 
of political communities. The political dimension is refl ected inadequately in sustainabil-
ity strategies, in particular when sustainability is understood as a global management 
strategy. And in the globalisation debate, economic and environmental considerations 
are frequently regarded as being in competition. Either emphasis is placed on the priority 
of the economy, or regret is expressed concerning the defensive environmental position 
in the globalisation context. But actually globalisation and sustainability can harmonise 
very well, and the more the political dimension is excluded the better they get on. 
There is such exclusion when, in accordance with the “three pillar model “ (in particular 
in the Final Report of the Study Commission “Protecting People and the Environment” 
of the 13th German Bundestag, 1998) the economic, the environmental and the social 
dimension of sustainability are to be handled equally and with their mutual interactions. 
Apart from the fact that this is usually not achieved, and the three dimensions are often 
dealt with in a vocabulary which is steeped in economics, such a model lacks the political 
dimension. This also becomes clear to the proponents of this approach to sustainability, at 
the latest when critical questions are asked about the ability of the available institutional 
structures to implement sustainable development.  
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The sustainability concept of the “syndrome approach” (in particular in the annual report 
of the advisory council of the German government “Global Environmental Changes”, 
WBGU 1999) also fails to take the political dimension suffi ciently into account. The 
syndrome approach addresses the “Earth system as a whole”, claims to present a new 
analytical method for the holistic examination of the current crisis, and it structures this 
using syndromes such as the spread of the deserts. The political element is excluded here, 
for example, because the approach works with a defi nition of the problem which is exclu-
sively in terms of natural sciences, and which views environmental problems as a com-
plex system of material fl ows and energy transformation processes. The social structures 
and democratic processes are not considered, neither when describing the problem, nor in 
the search for solutions. But if the problem of sustainability appears to be eco-systemic 
then it would seem logical to try to solve it by means of global environmental manage-
ment, which would only worsen the democracy problem inherent in the global govern-
ance architecture.  
The model of sustainable development was specifi ed according to Ulrich Brand and 
Christoph Görg “above all in the form of an economisation of nature“ (Görg; Brand 
2002, p. 15). Seen in this way, sustainable development does not represent an antithesis to 
neoliberal globalisation, but is assimilated by it; at the same time it is robbed of its critical 
content, or at least neutralised.
Our initial hypothesis, that the integration of sustainability and globalisation is only pos-
sible if democracy is thought and practised differently, is not compatible with the ideas of 
global environmental management – possibly even implemented top-down by a powerful 
government authority. This is fi rstly because the intervention is usually purely instru-
mental (related to the “resource” environment), and secondly because the global envi-
ronmental management as implemented is biased towards technocratic control optimism 
or managerism (ibid., 2002, p. 32). This means that the integration of governance and 
sustainability can become the sole responsibility of experts who defi ne the necessary 
environmental measures in detail without being embedded in a democratic setting. To 
what extent, then, does a sustainable governance approach consolidate an instrumental-
ised approach to nature – which in turn contributes signifi cantly to generating global 
environmental problems?  
It is important to take this problem into consideration when dealing with the intersection 
between governance, democracy and sustainability. And rather than carrying out global 
environmental management in the sense of perfected control over nature, we should look 
closely at the problematic paradigm of control over nature.
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3.2  A digression into the problem of dominance over nature
A forerunner of globalisation, according to the fi nal report published by the Study Com-
mission, was Eurocentric world trade. Its roots can be traced back to the centuries of the 
(European) seafarers with their great discoveries, the conquest of the “New World” and 
the formation of colonies. This fi rst fl owered in the seventeenth century and was, initially, 
extremely one-sided and consisted primarily of exploitation of the colonies by European 
powers (Enquete 2002, p. 49).
In addition to the purely geographic journeys of conquest and Eurocentric world trade, 
yet another dimension came into being. It was the English Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon 
who at that time, in his work entitled Novum Organum, presented the notion that in the 
course of the general invention of government, nature would also have to be governed. 
He wanted this to be understood as a kind of journey of intellectual conquest by way of 
which, now that the New World had been discovered physically, it should also and ulti-
mately be discovered intellectually. Among the many postulates in his programme for the 
dominance of nature, Francis Bacon determined that: 
1. “… our principal object is to make nature subservient to the state and wants of man, 
…” (Adler 1996, p. 159).
2. “… nature is only subdued by submission, …” (ibid., p. 137). This means that one can 
subdue nature only by submitting to her; the intellect will have to adapt itself to nature 
if it wishes to dictate her actions.
3. With the benefi t of divine grace he, Francis Bacon, decorated the nuptial bed of intel-
lect and nature. “The wedding songʼs entreaty is that the issue of this marriage may be 
assistance to humankind and a line of inventors, to ease and banish need and desola-
tion.” (Bacon [1620] 1990, 2nd Book, p. 51).
In this “programme for government”, aimed at domination, nature is fi rstly thought of 
as being homogenous, like the human states and wants. All across the face of the earth 
nature is to be made subservient to human purposes, which are everywhere identical. 
Secondly, nature serves exclusively human ends. She has no other, let alone her own, 
agenda. Thirdly, Francis Bacon conceptualises a “clever” dominance of nature, one which 
is adapted to nature. The mechanical arts of his time – today referred to as technology 
– are to dominate nature in accordance with and not contrary to nature. Fourthly, nature is 
granted no realm of action on her own; she is to develop in accordance with human pur-
poses. Fifthly, “nature” is thought of as being feminine whilst “intellect” is masculine; but 
they are to be reconciled or married one with the other. There derives from this, sixthly, 
a masculine lineage of inventors with whose aid the vicissitudes of the world would best 
be mastered.
Many of Baconʼs comments are appropriate to his own age. What remains for us today, 
however, is Baconʼs programme: By mastering nature it is possible to return to Paradise 
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on earth and to live in prosperity. One hardly realises how “Baconian” many of the solu-
tions put forth in conjunction with the ecology crisis and the sustainability debate actu-
ally are. Whenever, by way of science and technology, we are to dominate nature more 
effectively, more cleverly or just differently, that is where we fi nd ourselves in the middle 
of Baconʼs mindset. Baconʼs guiding principle – that humankind should master nature 
and by so doing could continuously improve its situation – remains valid down to this 
very day. The threshold at which one might say that the Baconian era has come to, or is 
drawing to, an end is found where this guiding principle – the improvement of the human 
situation by the mastery of nature – is questioned. In the prevailing debate, however, any-
one who objects to the Baconian paradigm is all too easily cast in the role of an enemy of 
humanity or, at least, of progress. 
Consequently it is useful to recall what the philosophising Lord Chancellor of an up-and-
coming world power was actually getting at: dictating the actions of others – be it nature, 
be it women, be it other peoples. The prerequisite here is that oneʼs own latitude for action 
either destroys or nullifi es that of the other. Here an analysis critical of dominance una-
voidably comes to the fore. To be examined here are the Baconian programme of domi-
nance over nature and the patterns of rationalism and mastery upon which it is based. This 
is particularly urgent when it must be assumed that dominance of nature is not limited to 
“nature proper”, but instead pervades society as a whole: 
• If natural resources can be reduced to their utility as an economic resource, then human 
resources can be reduced to exactly the same denominator.
• If nature is seen as inferior when compared with intellect or reason, and thus split off 
in dualist fashion, then this approach will not stop at human beings and human capaci-
ties, which are “naturalised” and then declared inferior.
• If it is possible to deal with nature only as “something apart” and only in terms of 
destruction, subjugation or assimilation, then this also threatens those declared to 
be members of “other” social groups, particularly when the dualistic touchstone of 
“good” and “evil” is employed.
As has already been mentioned, the instrumental aspect in Baconʼs understanding of 
nature is found in the fact that he intends to interpret nature in order to “to make nature 
subservient to the state and wants of man”. This is seen in his Aphorisms Concerning the 
Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man (ibid., pp. 81 f.), which form the core 
of the Novum Organum. The problem is not to be found in the fact that he wishes to use 
nature for human purposes but rather that this is the only form of access to nature. Nature 
is to be governed – and this in an era in which, as Michel Foucault formulated, the struc-
tures of power are being made ever more “government-like” (Foucault 1999, p. 128). 
But governing also means structuring the potential fi eld of action for the other – it means 
governance which intervenes and controls. 
Viewed in this way, the advance of globalisation is currently being driven by a neoliberal 
concept which is Baconist. Its fi rst goal is to prevent any other action at all and in so doing 
references itself especially to the paradigm of unlimited trade, subject to no restrictions 
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whatsoever. Secondly, unhindered access to nature as a resource, purely utilitarian in 
character, is assigned exclusively to unfettered trade. 
Approaches which place sustainable governance close to global management of the envi-
ronment can hardly offer any opposition here. They presuppose uniform, world-wide 
interest in a globalised and uniformly disciplined nature. They take into account nei-
ther the variety of natural phenomena and ways of dealing with nature nor democratic 
access to natural goods. Thus the view of the particular – though dominant – interests is 
obscured, which is seen above all in regard to resource access (Klare, 2001). Moreover, 
favoured here is a development path in technology (to dominate nature) in which uniform 
interest among all participants is assumed and which, in addition, takes hardly any con-
sideration of natural givens and the forms for the use of nature, both of which vary widely 
from place to place. 
Departing from the Baconian paradigm of dominance over nature is diffi cult. It would 
mean questioning the pattern of rationalism which is inherent to the West along with 
other rationalities; it would imply in particular recognising alternate ways of dealing with 
nature. The consequence would be that a democratically substantive concept of “sustain-
able governance” prohibits government being made subservient to neoliberal concepts 
of absolute privatisation. This would mean that the “resource” which is nature – or its 
technical and industrial substitute – would be available to global competition without 
restriction and nature as a “commodity” would be freely traded. Governance would then 
be nothing more than a helpless attempt by the government to compensate, at least in part 
and by way of resource management, for the defi cits which had in fact been caused by 
government itself. 
3.3 Globalisation, privatisation and global public goods 
Global governance, according to the Final Report of the Enquete Commission “Glo-
balisation of the World Economy – Challenges and Responses,” is oriented towards a 
“socially and environmentally sustainable conservation, protection and the management 
of public goods “ (Enquete 2002, p. 418). These public goods include peace, respect for 
human rights, social justice and an “intact environment”. For example, “climate” is a glo-
bal public good (ibid., p. 56). The threat to or neglect of public duties and public goods, 
according to the report, represents perhaps the most signifi cant threat of a globalisation 
which concentrates mainly on the increase in private goods by increasing global effi ciency 
(ibid.). Obviously, the Study Commission hopes to be able to counter this effectively with 
the concept of global public goods. We will now look at this approach, and in particular 
the work of Inge Kaul et al., although we reach different conclusions.
It remains the task of the state to ensure suffi cient equality, since the market economy 
cannot care alone for the well-being of all (ibid., p. 55). Therefore in global governance 
democratic legitimated actors should win back power to act against global problems and 
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not only react to the initiatives of powerful private actors within and beyond their borders 
(ibid., p. 420 & 421). At the same time, global governance should work effectively against 
the negative effects of neoliberal globalisation. Such a defensive strategy, however, runs 
the risk of being ineffective. The negative effects of environmental policy are clearly 
visible in chapter 8 about sustainable development. The sustainability model discussed 
adds hardly anything new to the debate, and in particular little which would be effective. 
Rather, it uncritically adopts the three-pillar model (environmental, economic and social 
sustainability) favoured in 1998 by the Enquete Commission ʻProtecting People and the 
Environment  ʼand regards this as an important orientation for a sustainability strategy. 
But the three-pillar model has been widely criticised not only because it excludes the 
political, but also because of the effective dominance of its economic dimension (e.g. 
Jungkeit, Katz, Weber, Winterfeld 2002). 
In recent years the concept of global public goods has established itself as a new frame 
of reference for the international debate on liberalisation and privatisation, the public or 
private nature of goods, and the future role of states and international organisations. The 
discussions about the contours of the concept and the strategies for fi nancing and man-
aging global public goods are still in their early stages. When it was adopted in 1998/99 
in UNDP circles (see Kaul et al. 1999), this was against the background of the fi nancial 
crisis in Asia and repeatedly postponed conference on development fi nancing. The central 
problem were the bottlenecks in development cooperation and the attempt to reinter-
pret (reframe) requirements and impacts as a way of mobilising more resources from the 
private economy for development cooperation. Development facts, the argument runs, 
should be weighted with respect to reciprocity and collective responsibility (ibid., p. xiii) 
and to this extent should be viewed in terms of an understanding of global public goods. 
The book published in 1999 has the sub-title “International cooperation in the 21st cen-
tury” and redefi nes a whole range of sectors from road signs through biodiversity to peace 
and just distribution in the light of the new frame of reference.
The impulse met with considerable interest, although the debate has not yet produced 
consolidated results or led to conceptual clarifi cation. Analytical and normative dimen-
sions of the concept of global public goods are often unwittingly mixed. However, posi-
tions are beginning to crystallise out. In particular civil society proponents tend to group 
around the concept of commons or common goods, such as air and water, which are not 
commodities in any form and which should not be subjected to economic exigencies as 
traded goods (e.g. Petrella 2000, Shiva 2002). Water is certainly an unsaleable good, and 
its acquisition and use is to be a matter for collective responsibility, with decisions made 
decentrally within the setting of local practice. 
Efforts from the civil society reach into the fi eld of the political institutions in order to 
link up to the concept of global public goods and to give this a form which mixes public 
and private elements specifi cally for each situation. But here the public character of a 
good is not based on the property of the good itself, but is regarded as a social construct 
and political convention. A good becomes public or private only as a result of regula-
tive measures. These measures are disputed and are the subject of social and political 
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confl icts. Every defi nition of global public goods and each decision about what should 
be treated as such therefore represents a political act, which must be subject to decisions 
within democratic structures and procedures. 
The privatisation of an area of supply which has previously been recognised as a public 
good is always associated with a loss of the public openness and thus with a restriction 
of democratic participation. In countries of the South the further consequence of the shift 
may be a loss of civil status. Anybody who cannot pay for their needs falls outside the 
system, and can at best hope for support from development cooperation. The World Bank 
(2003) clearly views the transfer to customer status more positively. Compared with the 
long political path, the short route via infl uence on service providers is much to be pre-
ferred. Whether people actually have the opportunity to take this route, or whether such a 
shift of existential public services will also lead to the sale of human rights and civil rights 
is not something they worry about. But it worries us. 
The context of globalisation, deregulation and privatisation and the extreme pressure in 
particular regarding water management in North and South, not least from the powerful 
international development agencies towards the privatisation of water supplies, has con-
tributed considerably towards making public goods a topic of debate. Is the concept of 
global public goods suited to preserving existential public services, an orientation to pub-
lic welfare, and social controllability as values and as the social practice? Concerning the 
neoliberal pressure on water as a resource and as a freely tradable good, which attitudes 
and actions are most suited and able to oppose this pressure?   
Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceicao, Katell Le Goulven, and Ronald U. Mendoza tackled this 
problem in their book “Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalisation” (2003) 
with a clear emphasis on the level of implementation, but the answers fi ll us with scepti-
cism. Is the provision of global public goods really a way to manage globalisation? Or is 
it more part of the problem than part of the solution? 
Globalisation, according to the book, gives rise to global goods as well as global bads, 
and at the same time is driven by these (Kaul et al. 2003, p. 3). They are therefore an 
element of globalisation. If this is to be managed, then the relationship between the pub-
lic and private must be re-invented. Concepts of public and private are in most cases 
social constructs. Public goods are usually described as goods of the public realm, but not 
goods provided by the state (ibid., p. 7). State authorities and markets can themselves be 
regarded as public goods (ibid.). Here things become unclear and it sounds almost as if 
the problems associated with globalisation can be solved in a new public-private partner-
ship by self-management of the global goods ʻstate  ʼand ʻmarketʼ.
In an historical review of public goods (ibid., p. 63–77) it is emphasised that public goods 
are often thought to be provided by the state. This, according to the authors is false in the 
current situation, because non-state actors are increasingly involved at both national and 
international levels. In addition, state expenditure for public goods is relatively young, 
historically speaking. Until the seventeenth century most state funds were spent on war. 
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It was only in the course of industrialisation that countries began to spend a signifi cant 
part of the state budget on the provision of public goods such as water. Often this did not 
happen without a struggle. A theory of public goods was developed in the “Golden years” 
of Keynesianism from 1945 to 1975, which at the same time was marked by enormous 
state growth. However, this period was an exception. Therefore it is necessary to take a 
new look at public goods and revise the concept. Public goods are not simply provided 
at the global level, and the public must be involved much more in the formulation of 
preferences. Participation is not required in the consumption of public goods, but in their 
production. How this is to be achieved remains an open question.  
Global public goods, according to Kaul et al., can be regarded as the sum of national 
public goods and international cooperation. Therefore the largest part of the global public 
goods are nationally fi nanced (ibid., p. 36). The fi nancing of global public goods  (such as 
international communication or transport systems) often functions very well and attracts 
private investors, because charges can be levied. However, there are many other global 
goods which are dependent on subsidies, as witnessed by the fact that currently some 30 
per cent of development aid is in the form of global public goods (ibid., p. 38). In the 
vision of the international community of the international public sphere ten global goods 
are identifi ed, namely: 
  1) basic human dignity,
  2) national sovereignty,
  3) global public health, 
  4) global security,
  5) global peace,
  6) harmonised, trans-boundary communication and transport systems, 
  7) harmonised, trans-boundary institutional infrastructures, 
  8) common management of knowledge, 
  9) common management of global natural “commons” in order to promote their sus-
tainable use,  
10) the availability of international arenas for multilateral negotiations between states, 
and also between states and non-state actors (ibid., p. 44). 
This shows, fi rstly, that “global public goods” refers to very different things at differ-
ent levels. Secondly, another concept is used when talking of sustainability, namely not 
“goods” but “commons.” Correspondingly, water could be included twice in this list, 
under institutional infrastructures and global natural “commons”.
The debate on commons was instigated by Garrett Hardin (1968) and immediately became 
linked with the term “tragedy.” But reviews of his essay on “The Tragedy of the Com-
mons” have frequently overlooked the fact that Hardin was actually focussing on the 
problem of population growth. He was searching for moral arguments for the restriction 
of liberties, or for achieving moderation – both in the use of commons as well as in repro-
duction. According to our view, this combination is highly problematical, but is hardly 
discussed. 
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If a common good is left for free use, then the tragedy for Garrett Hardin is that everybody 
tries to use as much of the limited resource as possible for their own advantage, which 
fi nally leads to the ruin of all (Hardin 1968, p. 1244). The situation is similar with the 
problem of pollution. Something which is available to all is exploited and defi led as long 
as all behave as independent and rational free entrepreneurs (ibid., p. 1245). His conclu-
sion is not the limitation of free entrepreneurship, but the abolition of the communal 
exploitation of commons. The system of private property and its inheritance is unjust, 
but such an injustice is preferable to the ruin of all (ibid., p. 1247). In a later text (Hardin 
1978) he sees only two possible solutions: Private enterprise or socialism (control of the 
commons by the government). He does not see other options.
The best-known response to Garrett Hardin has been formulated by David Feeny, Fikret 
Berkes, Bonnie J. McCay, und James M. Acheson. They argue expressly against set-
ting up a stark alternative between Market and State. In “The Tragedy of the Commons: 
Twenty-two Years Later” (Feeny et al. 1990) they also tackle the assumption that the 
communal use of resources leads to their exploitation or degradation. Their fi rst step is to 
distinguish between the resource itself and the ownership rights. Instead of commons they 
use the term “common-pool resources.” What Hardin refers to as a tragedy is actually the 
lack of well-defi ned ownership rights. This applies for “open access” elements, which are 
subject to a free-for-all. But it does not apply in the case of communal property, which 
is managed by an identifi able community where the users are dependent on one another. 
The authors distinguish between four categories of ownership rights: free access, private 
ownership, common ownership, and state ownership. For the latter three categories, they 
present both positive and negative examples of sustainable and non-sustainable use of 
common goods. Therefore it is not possible to say for any form of property that it was 
the only one or the best for a sustainable approach to commons. But what Garrett Hardin 
referred to as the tragedy of the commons only applies after conditions have been cre-
ated which allow free access to common goods. However, this was usually the result of 
the introduction of colonial rule, for example in the sub-Saharan region or on the Pacifi c 
islands (ibid., p. 6).
A similar approach is adopted by Vandana Shiva when considering the examples of the 
colonial destruction of communal water management in Southern India in the 18th Cen-
tury (Shiva 2002, p. 24). Commons, she emphasises, are not resources with open access. 
They require a concept of property at the level of user groups which establish rules for 
their use. The absence of private property can by no means be equated with lawless-
ness. Nor is resource management linked to private individuals (ibid., p. 26). Against this 
background, the statements of Garrett Hardin seem factually and historically question-
able. This point is raised among others by Gerhard Scherhorn (1998a and 1998b). The 
displacement of common goods, he explains, should be interpreted somewhat differently 
than in the legend of the greedy users. Historically, the common land was enclosed as 
grazing land (for wool production), and the local small-holders who has previously been 
able to use it were driven away. The principle of common goods was not undermined by 
the users but was broken by the usurpers.
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If the breakdown of the commons is not attributed to the search for benefi t by the indi-
vidual user, but to a new form of cooperation between state and business (which promotes 
private property and undermines communal property), then this results in new solution 
strategies. At the same time these are associated with another approach to politics: In their 
actions, people are not only (and possibly also not primarily) motivated to be socially 
and environmentally aware by material advantages (market) or drastic sanctions (state). 
Rather, they are also able to act with awareness simply if they are allowed to, or when 
their socially and environmentally motivated actions are not undermined. However, there 
is an obvious danger of painting a picture of traditional societies free from all ambiva-
lence. For Vandana Shiva, for example, it is the indigenous communities who created the 
rules and limitations for water use and with this guarantee sustainability and equality in 
the dealings with water (Shiva 2002, p. 12). For Gerhard Scherhorn feudal societies were 
based on a principle of mutual solidarity, in which the peasants worked the land owned 
by their feudal lord, who in turn represented and protected them (Scherhorn, 1998b). He 
does, though, concede that while this was the ideal, the reality may often have been rather 
different (1998a). There is a considerable risk of idealising traditional societies, particu-
larly when they can serve as a counter-model to current globalisation developments. We 
do not assume that indigenous or feudal societies were per se more free, more sustain-
able or more egalitarian. In particular the peasants in the later Middle Ages were feudally 
subordinate. And the pre-colonial access to water may frequently have been regulated by 
hierarchies – including gender hierarchies. It is hardly possible to derive principles from 
this for a sustainable governance in the current situation. However, there is one parallel: 
Local communal management and communities are broken up in accordance with central 
or centralistic requirements, which immediately set themselves up as irreplaceable and 
permit no alternatives.  
The concept of global public goods is only in part able to set a counterpoint. The intended 
new relationship between public and private as well as state and market obscures the fact 
that to this day both have partially failed with respect to global natural commons. One rea-
son for this probably lies in what Vandana Shiva notes in her seventh principle of a “Water 
democracy”: “Water is not a human invention. It cannot be bound and has no boundaries. 
It is by nature a commons. It cannot be owned as private property and sold as a com-
modity” (Shiva 2002, p. 36). The new nexus of market and state can at best be applied 
to the supply and disposal, that is to the infrastructures, but not to water as common. But 
basically infrastructures and  commons point to a similar problem: Whereas the immense 
intensifi cation of water management is intended to market the  resource water as profi t-
ably as possible, not only the need for its regeneration has been neglected but also the 
ecological water cycle.4 Whereas elements of infrastructure are currently being removed 
from the scope of public services and made freely tradable commodities, there is the 
risk that the specifi c local environmental requirements for an appropriate and sustainable 
4 Signifi cantly, the fi rst chapter of the Gender and Water Development Report (2003) is dedicated to the 
topic of „Water for Nature“. 
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water and sewerage service will be ignored, as will the social context of the infrastruc-
tures. Against this background there is not really a need for a conception of global public 
goods which re-confi gures the public and the private spheres. Rather, in connection with 
sustainable governance there is a need for a political approach which encourages and 
protects a varied sustainable governance from below for each locality and is active for 
this in an international context. The concept of “commons” seems better suited for this. It 
indicates (e.g. in Elinor Ostrom et al. 2002) that the use of common goods is inseparably 
linked to the question of property rights. “When no property rights defi ne who can use a 
common pool resource and how its uses are regulated, a common pool resource is under 
an open-access regime.” (Ostrom et al. 2002, p. 18)
There must be doubts whether the existing approaches to global governance will be able, 
in the intersection between globalisation, democracy and sustainability, to work against 
the defi cits associated with globalisation in the fi elds of democracy and the environment. 
It is not enough to show new control procedures and new constellations of actors. What 
we have referred to as “double privatisation” in the neoliberal project increasingly shifts 
the production and care of public goods into the sphere of action of the private economy, 
where systematic self-regulation is preferred to state regulation, and thus a core area 
of state duties is withdrawn from the sphere of popular infl uence. The transfer of con-
trol and decision processes to new fl uctuating transboundary constellations of actors also 
 contributes towards a loss of democratic procedures of authorisation and public commu-
nications channels. 
A relationship between governance, democracy, and sustainability outside the Baconian 
programme for dominance over nature implies fi rstly different contents and forms of 
government and secondly another restructuring of the political sphere than that of dou-
ble privatisation. At the centre of a new formulation of democracy, based on sustainable 
globalisation there would not only be a democracy defi cit concerning the institutions and 
procedures. Rather the debate would concentrate on a sustainable concept of the political 
which would not centre on the conventional “governing” in the sense of “steering, or rul-
ing”, but is based on widely varying local, cultural abilities and customs for the formation 
of social-environmental relationships, and at the same time enables these. Inasmuch, it 
is not only a matter of adding the failing political dimension to the so-called three-pillar 
model and to insist on the political shaping of sustainability. The task is also to com-
bine the general questions of democratic theory with that of democratic access to natural 
goods. This also addresses alternatives to thinking and action relating to the domination 
of nature. At the theoretical level, an alternative approach has been developed in a study 
of the Helmholtz Gemeinschaft (Kopfmüller et al., 2001). No attempt is made to integrate 
the political level in the three-pillar model. Rather, the general demand for common val-
ues was taken up and a normative foundation outlined for sustainable development. From 
this, minimum demands were derived  as well as rules and indicators (ibid., p. 179 f.). 
However, this approach remained at the anthropocentric level, i.e. nature is viewed solely 
at the anthropocentric level. The only proviso is that the anthropocentrism should be 
“enlightened”. But this obscures the way to less dominant approaches to nature. In order 
to reshape and rethink democracy, it is not enough to integrate minimum demands and 
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basic regulations for sustainable development into the existing globalisation procedures. 
Rather the aim is to combine other approaches to nature with democratic structuring. This 
aspect can be illustrated using the example of water.
The sustainable treatment of water, beyond the Baconian dominance of nature, would 
have to leave, as a fi rst step, the level of abstraction of a homogeneous global natural good 
to be handled in the same way all over the world. Abstract references to “water” cover a 
number of aspects. Whereas there is “open access” to oceans, rivers are usually subject to 
national governments. Supplies of clean water and sewerage systems, on the other hand, 
are usually organised at the communal level. At the same time, water does not meet the 
same human needs everywhere. The goals of someone who relies on water to sustain 
life are different from the goals of those who want to make profi ts with supplying water 
and sewerage services. The water itself cannot be subjected as some abstract generality 
to a technological apparatus for dominating nature, but must be perceived, accepted and 
treated in its specifi c qualities and manifestations.
Lyla Metha therefore proposes an “integrated water management” in connection with the 
concept of global public goods (see Kaul et al. 2003, pp. 556 - 575). She queries the use of 
the term public with regard to access rights to water, and emphasises that water is far from 
having the properties of a global public good. The access to water refl ects power asym-
metries, shows socio-economic inequalities and other distribution factors such as land 
ownership (ibid., p. 556). Therefore it is important to distinguish between the abstract 
designation of water as a common resource and water as resource in real life. Integrated 
water management could take account of such differences and can be based on the access 
to water as a human right. The supply with water must be organised on the basis of the 
various water systems; they must sometimes be managed locally, at other times national 
or even trans-nationally. The challenge for “water governance” lies in achieving a balance 
between the principles of subsidiarity and global governance. Water must not be traded 
as a global good on an open market, because this would seriously undermine the right to 
water. Efforts are necessary to ensure access to water for all people and to guarantee an 
appropriate supply, embedded in local realities, and combined with global actions and 
concerns (ibid., p. 570).  
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4 On the necessity for alternative models
The governance discussion touches on a number of levels and fi elds. It is conducted from 
a number of different standpoints and orientations, depending on the force of tradition, 
the perceived urgency of problems and the socio-economic structuring of the fi eld of 
actors. Here we refer mainly to the debate in the German-speaking countries, and focus 
on specifi c key aspects for a concept of sustainable governance, namely that of the under-
lying conceptualisations of nature and politics. 
We argue that the conceptual formulations of both nature and politics contain a variety of 
restrictions and distortions rooted in the logic of dominance which should not be included 
in a future proposal for the relationship between sustainability and democracy in the 
context of globalisation. We conclude that before new institutions and methodologies 
are developed, which will certainly be much more “concrete” than the considerations 
presented here, and before this is possible with a justifi able claim to be ʻnew  ʼand ʻdiffer-
entʼ, the contents of the concepts must be subjected to a critical analysis, particularly with 
respect to a critique of power. 
We have attempted to present the reasons for this in terms of the key points of the existing 
governance and sustainability concepts. On the basis of our analysis of weak points we 
could show that it will be diffi cult to remedy the problems if the political project of neo-
liberal globalisation is dammed, in while the social causes of the breaking fl ood of global 
markets still remains untouched. Our consideration of alternative approaches shows that 
there are other possibilities for societalisation than those offered by neo-liberal globalisa-
tion. For example, the view of the problems of dominance-ridden societal relationships 
with nature only becomes clearer when nature is not conceived of as dead material lying 
beyond the political, only playing a role in the debate as an environmental resource. 
Similarly, the view of the power-affected societal market relations only becomes clearer 
when the market is not conceived of as an institutions remote from politics involving only 
private actors, who at best can be reined in somewhat.  
As far as the necessary reformulation of democratic politics is concerned, it seems prom-
ising to orient towards an understanding of political economy – rather than constructing 
the market as a separate, independent sphere – with the introduction of the concept of 
hegemony as a level of analysis sui generis. This approach makes it possible to disclose 
the political in the economic, restoring the conceptual primacy of the political and thus 
also of community-related shaping (Krätke 2002). This seems more promising than the 
somewhat helpless postulatory demands in the conventional governance debate to shape 
and re-embed a rudderless economy. Just as in recent years end-of-pipe environmental 
protection has gradually become less important than the precautionary principle, so the 
retrospective democratisation of neo-liberal globalisation could give way to precaution-
ary democratisation.  
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There is general agreement among those involved in the debate on global governance that 
globalisation has a fundamental effect on the form of the political, and that the political 
shaping of globalisation requires new boundaries to be drawn and opens up new terrain. 
Alongside the schools of thought discussed here we regard this situation as a “window of 
opportunity” to introduce genuinely democratic openings in the course of the unavoidable 
process of change. The search therefore is for the contours of a concept of the political 
which is appropriate for globalisation, and which in contrast to the dominant neo-liberal 
closures and sealing opens up the space and the ground for a reformulation of democratic 
claims, formulated from a perspective of gender responsibility. The on-going destruc-
tion of the political sphere by the apodictic and power-based construction of economic 
constraints should at least be confronted with the possibility of a bifurcation. But we do 
assume that there are no privileged and predefi ned actors of social change, nor central, 
theoretically predetermined starting points. It is just as impossible to determine generally 
valid institutional forms and structural settings. However, the critical review of the ʻfate  ʼ
of political processes under the conditions of neoliberal, patriarchally-formed globalisa-
tion can give indications of other possible directions. 
A reformulation of the political will not stand without structural changes. The corre-
sponding strategy proposals are referred to by the international womenʼs movements as 
ʻtransformative politics  ʼor in left-wing politics as ʻradical reformismʼ. Whatever term is 
used, it is clear that there can hardly be a democratisation within the currently dominant 
parameters of globalisation. Key preconditions for democratic politics must fi rst and fore-
most be regulated and secured by the nation states. That the nation state can still claim 
a fundamental role is also underlined by Inge Kaul et al. in their recent publication on 
the provision of global public goods. “The state is still responsible for translating policy 
consensus into binding policy decisions and perhaps law” (Kaul et al.1999, p.182, see 
also Kaul et al. 2003). It also sets the binding framework for the communicative forms 
of democratic decision-making. The content of the canon of the common good and the 
global public goods, and the attitudes to gender justice and to nature are therefore of key 
importance. Strategies for reconquering the political sphere do not treat the state as a uni-
form actor, but regard it as a fi eld for strategic action within and beyond which the points 
and levels of intervention must be found, and the starting points for new forms of political 
communalisation. To this extent, the contents and the location of nation-state governance 
is a central topic in the dispute about the global redetermination of the political. At the 
same time the search for new forms of democratic control and participation directs atten-
tion towards other levels, at which effective political community is formed.
All proposals for reconquering the political sphere agree that transparency and account-
ability must be secured at all levels. Already a decade ago, Narr and Schubert wrote that 
the fi rst principle for a system of political institutions appropriate for globalisation was 
“to create conditions which enable the citizens everywhere to understand ʻtheir  ʼworld 
which nowadays irrevocably has turned global, and to act in a way which is at least 
locally relevant” (Narr; Schubert 1994, p. 254). Transparency is one such essential condi-
tion. In the fi nal analysis this involves nothing less than the recall of state accountability 
regarding the articulated concerns of citizenship. If the current prime responsibility of 
38 Claudia von Braunmühl und Uta von Winterfeld
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
state bodies towards the social forces of globalisation and the resultant logic of action is 
laid open, then at least the preconditions for democratic intervention are improved. At the 
local level, it may be easier to provide the evidence of options and decisions, in contrast 
to the claims of constraints. In any case, whether at local or international levels, the (fur-
ther) development of democratic rules of procedure (rights to information, access, and a 
hearing) concerning the level of choice may extend beyond the national framework, but 
cannot leap over it. 
What then gives credible democratic legitimacy to the decisions made by state bodies? 
There has been an interesting shift regarding this point in the dramaturgy of the global 
governance proponents. In 1992 there was still a difference between the two editors of the 
book “Governance without Government”, which virtually launched the debate. Czempiel 
defi ned governance as “the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to 
command that they be done” (Czempiel 1992, p. 250); Rosenau, in contrast, as “a system 
of rule that is as dependent on intersubjective meanings as on formally sanctioned consti-
tutions and charters” (Rosenau 1992, p. 4). In this defi nition, the legitimacy of governance 
is derived as much from formally correct, legally binding political foundations as from 
shared interpretations. Ten years later, Rosenau based governance completely on author-
ity and defi nes it as the “steering mechanism that produces compliance between relevant 
actors”. Authority in turn is defi ned as “the effect that power exercises over those in the 
fi eld of power” (lecture notes). But it will be recalled that in times of neoliberal deregula-
tion and privatisation “this new normativity comes from the world of private power yet 
installs itself in the public realm and in so doing contributes to de-nationalizing what has 
historically been constructed as national state agendas” (Sassen 2000, p. 393), which can 
be recognised as pure hegemony. There is no need here for efforts to set up procedures 
of democratic legitimisation. The action of power which successfully gains consensus or 
suppresses dissent acquires legitimisation from within itself and from compliance. Both 
remain entirely unquestioned in terms of their democratic substance. It is precisely this 
closure to public participation and protest, aimed at securing hegemony, that the insist-
ence on accountability takes issue with. If de-nationalisation is not seen as delimitation 
but as a shift in the logic of action of state agencies, then the common good is not served 
by any forms of participation within the framework of an externally-prescribed logic.  
A very different concept of legitimacy, extending into a proposal for democracy, is pre-
sented by feminist theory. Of the various approaches, we refer mainly to authors such as 
Seyla Benhabib and Barbara Holland-Cunz who have addressed in particular questions of 
democracy and citizenship in the context of globalisation. As already commented, from 
the feminist perspective there is not only a downside to the fact that “the problematic of 
de-democratisation of governance in the course of its internationalisation cannot be over-
come with a conventional understanding of democracy, with its eyes on a parliamentary 
majority democracy” (Wolf 2001, p. 7). The widely acknowledged erosion of parliamen-
tary democracy is regarded as an opportunity to tackle the gender-political splitting of 
democracy.  
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Feminist theory draws key components of this process from views of democracy based 
on discursive theory with a more comprehensive understanding of democratic legitimacy. 
Here democratic development of an informed opinion is attributed an epistemic function. 
At the same time, additional sources of legitimisation can be included which are neglected 
by conventional political institutions. It is precisely these qualities, which allow for both 
elements of globalisation, however interpreted, and also gender democratic demands. 
This is the starting point for Benhabib with her proposition for a deliberative democ-
racy. In the model of deliberative democracy, the borders between the public and private 
spheres must be seen as discursive, debatable and politically redefi nable. “Matters such 
as genders relations and the legal position of women and children, which are assigned in 
political liberalism to the private sphere, are viewed in the model of deliberative democ-
racy as topics to be discussed in the public realm” (Benhabib 2000, p. 111 f.). Interde-
pendencies of public virtues and private needs can thus take on a political form. This 
presupposes that the underlying discourse ethic does not judge only from the standpoint 
of formal justice. The central premises of the discourse ethic are universal respect and 
egalitarian reciprocity, i.e. norms which lead to the political and constitutional recogni-
tion of universal human rights, including both social and gender justice.   
Democracy becomes a form of living founded on an active consensus which has to be 
re-established continuously. It includes space for the articulation of new actors involved 
in governance procedures. All those participating, including the private actors, cannot 
simply refer to a logic of action based on their own interests, like in classic participation 
procedures, but must plausibly demonstrate in the discourse their commitment to general 
norms. Discourses are therefore also learning processes, reaching into controversial nor-
mative questions of cultural and religious practice. It is not possible to determine once 
and for all how universal human rights can protect the individual, rather this is derived 
from the global, discrimination-free discourse within the cultural context. In this regard, 
democracy draws its legitimacy less from the observance of institutionally defi ned pro-
cedures than from the democratic quality of the processes of deliberation and decision-
making.5 It is thus a model of democratic legitimacy which does not by defi nition submit 
to the force of the factual. Rather, the reformulation of the political in the tension between 
locality, nation state and globality, necessary under any circumstances, is approached 
with concepts which want to illuminate the content of this continuum and make it the 
object of democratic access, thus opposing the strategies of dual privatisation. 
Barbara Holland-Cunz in turn picks up this thread in her work on feminist democracy the-
ory when she seeks a way between the claim for feminist transformation and the demands 
for participation in representative parliamentary democracy. The search will have to com-
bine social critique, visionary proposals, and strategic refl ection and as a consequence 
5 When David Held insists, in his proposal for a cosmopolitan democracy, on a „common structure of 
political action“ (Held 1995), then this is much closer to the normative procedural  understanding out-
lined here than the ambivalent concept of „coherence“ .
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orient itself analytically and normatively within democratic theory. Holland-Cunz marks 
the cornerstone of a feminist democracy theory with six characteristics: critical of domi-
nance, participatory, directly democratic, discursive, relationship-oriented, and radical 
(Holland-Cunz 1998, p. 107ff.), which she then draws point by point into dialogue with 
the main tendencies of the debate on global governance and democracy. Her concept 
of participation is based on communal virtues, establishes a link between everyday life 
and national political institutions, and in turn strengthens the need for and the ability 
to achieve further participation. For Holland-Cunz, too, the discursive lies at the centre 
of the design. Here gender sensibility can be practised in speaking and listening; in the 
ongoing discussions at regional and national levels the necessary fi eld of learning can be 
found for international discussion forums; and fi nally in democratic consensus-oriented 
exchanges regulations can be found for the necessary global decision-making processes. 
In his work on a “deliberative supra-nationalism” as a model of “democratic governance 
beyond the nation-state” Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, who is dealt with at length by Holland-
Cunz, recalls that the globalisation process not only reduces the quality of the democratic 
legitimacy but also weakens the ability of the nation-state to commit itself to its members. 
Also under this aspect, new ways are needed to form political communities. He combines 
this search with the hope that it would be possible to introduce goals and objectives into 
the new structures and procedures which were only inadequately accommodated in the 
received framework of the nation-state. Once again, considerable emphasis is placed on 
the “unifying features” of the discursive procedure which are able to combine the inter-
ests of the electorate with universal accountability. And, again, a key precondition is “that 
the demand for social equality must be understood as of equal origin to the idea of demo-
cratic formation of opinion “ (Schmalz-Bruns 1999, p. 211). 
There are obvious objections. The institutionalisation of deliberative supranational pro-
cedure integrated in sectoral policies which Schmalz-Bruns outlines seems inappropri-
ate for the lofty goals. The radical reformism drawing on Gramsci, on the other hand, 
for all the analytical validity regarding the political impact of hegemonial relations of 
production, is hardly able to present an alternative proposal. Finally, the objection raised 
for decades against the feminist reception of democracy theory based on discursive eth-
ics can easily be applied, namely with the image of “a discursively self-creating inclu-
sive, plural citizens  ʼcommunity” (Holland-Cunz 1998, p. 172) to completely miss the 
lines of confl ict structuring the society, which was identifi ed not least through the critical 
analysis of feminist theorists. To this extent, one must certainly agree with Benhabibʼs 
plea for “institutional imagination”. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the process-centred 
concepts of deliberative-democratic approaches are pointing in the right direction. They 
could possibly confront the various vacuous formal-democratic institutions with other, 
more authentic sources of democratic legitimisation and at the same time provide build-
ing blocks for an architecture of global governance.  
The shift of the boundaries between public and private resulting from the neo-liberal 
project redefi nes social citizenship. The shift of the boundaries of dual privatisation in 
favour of the market, and the associated shift of work into private households limits the 
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space for political shaping and minimises the possibilities for the democratic structuring 
of personal life practices. While the burden on the national budget is visibly reduced, the 
increased burden falling on private households, and thus primarily on women, is not vis-
ible or accountable. Conversely, the limitation of the welfare state brings with it a redefi -
nition of the privateness of women. This is delimited, made economically functional and 
severely restricted as a sphere of self-determination. The process clearly demonstrates the 
extent to which the social contract is based on a highly asymmetric gender contract. 
While it dismantles and eclipses the social dimension of citizenship status, the globali-
sation process itself generates a multiplicity of local cultures, which calls into question 
the classic concept of citizenship, with its assumptions of a certain homogeneity. We can 
look back on a rich debate on citizenship, promoted in particular by feminist theorists 
stressing the relevance of difference. The necessity of bringing cultural and religious dif-
ferences into the discussion and fi nding suitable forms for this in everyday life, may for 
its part contribute to practising dialogue and deliberation. In any case, the division of the 
components of citizenship which were previously thought of together more or less with-
out refl ection, namely “collective identity, privileges of political participation and social 
rights and entitlements” (Benhabib 2000, p. 88), leads to a re-determination of citizenship 
status in the globalisation context. 
Just how a new social contract would have to order the relationship between the public 
and the private, what constitutes the genuinely public and what the private, cannot be 
categorically defi ned, but has to be politically negotiated in the framework of deliberative 
democracy.
A central feature of the liberal concept of global governance is that state actions are set 
in a new relationship to civil society through various forms of stakeholder participation. 
Whereas in the early stages of the debate civil society was credited with a high level of 
democratic virtues and capacity for communication and refl ection, the view has recently 
become more sober. It cannot be denied altogether that the change of view is linked to 
the discursive success of the globalisation critics. Yet, they were actually the fi rst to point 
out that they in no way see themselves as sources of legitimisation for a system which is 
increasingly restricting the space for political shaping (Gestaltung) (e.g. Brunnengräber 
et al. 2001). 
In a concept which sees civil society as systematically linked along axes of dominance 
with the state apparatus, which in turn increasingly follows an agenda for securing com-
petitiveness of location, it is not surprising to fi nd elements of dominance in the civil 
society. Critics of capitalism have therefore repeatedly pointed out that “the inclusion 
of NGOs in regulated cooperation structures cannot be described per se as a gain”; at 
best it is a “ form of compensation for democracy” (Görg/Hirsch 1998, p. 336). The 
investigation of specifi c network processes has also shown “a much smaller democrati-
sation potential of global political networks” (Dingwerth 2003, p. 69) than is frequently 
assumed. From a feminist perspective, as was clearly shown in the reports presented to 
the Study Commission by Ilse Lenz (2002) and Uta Ruppert (2002), it cannot be assumed 
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either that participatory processes in themselves are suited to interrupt or exert leverage 
on androcentrically structured political processes. “The much-praised civil society is not 
per se friendly towards women, indeed the associative forms and discursive contexts may 
well be more discriminatory against women than parliamentary decision-making proce-
dures” (Sauer 2001, p. 69). Network analyses have disclosed the extent to which suppos-
edly horizontal networks are marked by male-organised patterns of action and structures 
and generate systematic constellations of inequality, marginalisation, and exclusion of 
women (Schunter-Kleemann 2003). 
It is interesting to recall that Heldʼs “democratic political community” is not constituted 
a priori with a reference to human rights or citizenship, but should be regarded from a 
democracy theoretical perspective in varied, trans-boundary and trans-sectorial networks 
which overlap to form a suitable place for democratic ʻpolicy makingʼ. The possibility 
of such a democratic community largely depends on the extent to which it is possible to 
shape the interior architecture of political communities in such a way that they accom-
modate and reaffi rm oneʼs own social and political goals. Regarding the geographical 
dimension there is a general consensus about the desirability of broad political, economic 
and social decentralisation. The hope is that at local and regional levels, forms of self-
determination of communal existence are most likely to be practised which are integrated 
in every-day life and which at the same time are instrumental in transcending it. At these 
levels it may also possibly be easier to intervene in a concrete fashion in the processes 
of hegemonially anchored injustice, and to bestow plausibility and co-power on efforts 
oriented towards the common good, the securing of the natural conditions of life as well 
as the individual and communal quality of life.  
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